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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This matter is on appeal from a jury verdict finding Franklin Ward
Osterhoudt guilty of one count of rape, one count of incest, and two counts of
lewd conduct with a minor under 16 years.

Osterhoudt appeals, challenging

evidentiary rulings by the district court judge at trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A jury found Franklin Ward Osterhoudt guilty of rape, incest, and two
specific incidents of lewd and lascivious conduct. (R., pp. 843-45.

1
)

The victim

of these crimes is Osterhoudt's daughter, H.O., who was between 11 and 15
years old when the crimes occurred.

(See 2011 PSI, pp. 1-3.) H.O. reported

that Osterhoudt began molesting her when she was five years old. (2011 PSI, p.
2.)
H.O., who testified that she loves her father and did not want him to get in
trouble, first disclosed being sexually abused by Osterhoudt when she was five,
but no charges came of it.

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 1440, L. 21 - p. 1441, L. 8; p.

1473, Ls. 16-17; p. 1475, Ls. 9-21; 2011 PSI, p. 8.) She did not report the abuse
again until she was 15; that disclosure led to the charges and Osterhoudt's
conviction here. (2011 PSI, p. 2.)

1

Citations to the Record reference the electronic copy's pagination.
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The state filed charges against Osterhoudt in March 2007. (R., pp. 2225.) However, Osterhoudt fled to Mexico and his warrant was not served until he
returned in June 2009. (2011 PSI, pp. 10-11.)
This case went to trial three times. The first trial resulted in a mistrial after
the jury informed the court it could not come to a unanimous decision. (R., pp.
149-59.) In the second trial, the jury found Osterhoudt guilty of all seven counts.
(R., p. 519.) However, the court granted the defense's motion for mistrial due to
constitutional error in the prosecution's closing argument. (R., pp. 520-32.) The
third trial, from which this appeal is taken, was conducted in February 2011.
(See 2011 Trial Tr.)
Before trial, Osterhoudt moved to exclude audio recordings of jail calls
based on late disclosure. (R., pp. 731-32.) The court ruled that, because the
tapes had not been disclosed until less than a month before trial, the state would
not be able to use them in its case in chief. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 49, Ls. 1-3.) The
court also held that the state could not admit the tapes as rebuttal without further
court order, upon showing why it should be allowed. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 49, L. 5-9.)
The hearing also addressed the defense's objection to the state's
renewed Notice of Intent to Present 404(b) Evidence.

(R., pp. 675-76.)

The

state had filed a similar notice prior to the second trial. (See R., pp. 241-69.)
Objecting to the renewed notice, the defense argued that 404(b) evidence
should be excluded because the notice was late. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 52, L. 20 - p.
55, L. 20.) The court ruled that the defense enjoyed the best possible notice of
404(b) evidence through the prior trial's proceedings. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 67, Ls. 7-
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23; p. 69, Ls. 8-16.) The state could introduce 404(b) evidence in its case in
chief to the extent it had been allowed in the prior trial. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 68, Ls. 911.)
At trial, H.O. testified that Osterhoudt forced her to have sex when she
was 11, around the Fourth of July in 2002. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 628, L. 23 - p. 629,
L. 4; p. 631, L. 24 - p. 632, L. 18.) H.O. testified that this caused her to bleed,

noting she did not start menstruating until a year later, when she was 12. (2011
Trial Tr., p. 632, L. 24 - p. 633, L. 8.) H.O. further testified that, a few years
later, she asked her father when she had lost her virginity, and Osterhoudt told
her it was when she was 11. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 628, Ls. 7-17.) In that same
conversation, H.O. told him that having sex with him made her feel "horrible ...
like I was nothing. Like I was just ruined and broken, and that I would have no
life and no future." (2011 Trial Tr., p. 715, Ls. 5-1 O; p. 716 Ls. 5-7.) When she
told him this, Osterhoudt got mad and did not want to talk about it, or about
anything. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 716, Ls.13-16.)
H.O. testified that, when she was younger, she would push Osterhoudt
away, and yell, plead and beg for him to stop. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 637, Ls. 1-6.)
She said that once, when struggling to get away from under him, she hit her
head into the wall. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 637, Ls. 21-23.) After that, she stopped
fighting him because she knew "it was just going to happen anyway." (2011 Trial
Tr., p. 637, L. 24 - p. 638, L. 3.) H.O. testified that, sometimes, to deal with her
emotions, she would burn her skin with metal or hot wax until she could not feel
the heat anymore, because she felt she was disgusting. (2011 Trial Tr., p.716,
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L. 21 - p. 717, L. 2.)

H.O. also testified she was not worried about getting

pregnant from Osterhoudt's abuse because he told her he had had a vasectomy.
(2011 Trial Tr., p. 666, Ls. 13-18.)
H.O. testified that Osterhoudt had sex with her on a family camping trip to
Balanced Rock for her 1ih birthday in 2003. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 609, Ls. 15-19; p.
614, L. 23 - 618, L. 23; see also R., p. 23 (Count Ill).) She also testified that on
New Year's Day one year, Osterhoudt told her to see him in the lambing shed
before she could go to the movies with her cousin and a friend. (2011 Trial Tr.,
p. 656, L. 13-19.) When H.0. went to see him there, Osterhoudt made her have
sex with him. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 656, Ls. 22-24; p. 665, L. 20 - 666, L. 12; see
also R., p. 24 (Count V).) Another time, Osterhoudt told H.O. he had a surprise
for her, and led her to a van in a junkyard where he had sex with her. (2011 Trial
Tr., p. 690, L. 24 - 693, L. 17; see also R., p. 24 (Count VI).)
H.O. testified that Osterhoudt let her drink alcohol with friends, have sex
with boys, and use marijuana and methamphetamine. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 672, Ls.
19-25; p. 679, L. 24 - p. 680, L. 7.) She also testified that her father gave her
methamphetamine; the first time was April 20, 2005.

2

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 673, Ls.

11-14.) H.O. recalled that in June 2005, Osterhoudt told H.O. he would give her
money, take her shopping, or give her meth in exchange for sex. (2011 Trial Tr.,
p. 676, L. 21 - p. 677, L. 1.) H.O. also recalled that, around the Fourth of July

2

H.O. recalled the exact date because it was "national pot smoking holiday," and
she was smoking pot with her friend Cammy that day. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 674, Ls.
11-14.)
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that year, Osterhoudt told H.O. he would give her meth if she had sex with him;
she refused. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 677, L. 15 - p. 678, L. 2.)
H.O. testified that the last time her father had sex with her was in
November 2006, when she was 14. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 710, L. 25 - p. 711, L. 1;
p. 712, Ls. 1-7.) About six months before that, she had started dating Travis
Pederson, who was about 19 years old. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 681, L. 6-13; p. 682,
Ls. 14.) Travis got along well with Osterhoudt; when H.O. told her father how old
Travis was, Osterhoudt did not care.

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 684, Ls. 9-13.)

October 2006, Travis was arrested on marijuana charges.

In

(2011 Trial Tr., p.

694, Ls. 7-9.) After that, Osterhoudt told H.O. to be careful "because the cops
would be watching [Travis], and if they saw [H.O. and Travis] together, then they
would start watching [Osterhoudt]."

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 694, Ls. 17-20.) H.O.

would sneak phone calls to Travis, and leave school with Travis on her lunch
breaks. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 698, L. 19-21.)
One day after school, Osterhoudt told H.O. she could not see Travis
anymore because she was developing an attitude. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 700, Ls.
12-14.)

H.O. and Osterhoudt got into an argument, and H.O yelled that

Osterhoudt was doing the same thing that Travis was doing, referring to having
sex with her.

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 708, Ls. 18-21.)

In response, Osterhoudt

grabbed H.O. by the hair, dragged her into the house and locked her in her
room. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 708, Ls. 23-25.) H.0. was grounded in her room from
that point through the Thanksgiving school break. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 711, Ls. 1017.) One night during that break, Osterhoudt came to H.0.'s room and woke her
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up around 3:00 a.m., telling her he wanted sex. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 712, L. 10- p.
713, L. 9.) Osterhoudt climbed on top of H.O. and had sex with her. (2011 Trial
Tr., p. 713, Ls. 15-24; see also R., p. 23 (Count I).)
On November 30, after that Thanksgiving break, H.O. told Travis about
her father's abuse. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 17, L. 9 - p. 18, L. 1; p. 717, L. 23.) Travis
told his mother, who took H.O. to tell the school principal, Mike Gemar. (2011
Trial Tr., p. 718, L. 17 - p. 719, L. 7.)
Health and Welfare.

Mr. Gemar contacted the police and

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 24, Ls. 9-1 O; p. 720, Ls. 3-7.)

Law

enforcement initiated its investigation that day. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 38, Ls. 15-22.)
The state filed charges against Osterhoudt about four months later. (R., pp. 2225.)

Osterhoudt was taken into custody when he turned himself in upon

returning from Mexico in June 2009. (2011 PSI, pp. 10-11.)
While in jail awaiting trial, Osterhoudt made and received many phone
calls that were recorded by the jail. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1444, Ls. 8-17.) Sheriff's
Deputy Becky White listened to roughly 400 minutes of recorded calls. (2011
Trial Tr., p. 1514, L. 24 - p. 1515, L. 2.)

Of those, she selected about 15

minutes that she felt were representative of Osterhoudt's discussions to prepare
for trial. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1515, Ls. 3-13.) These recordings were admitted at
trial as exhibits 66-74. (2011 Trial Tr., pp. 1500-08.) Exhibit 66 is a conversation
between Osterhoudt and his niece Shaylene Massie. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1500,
Ls. 14-21.)

The rest are conversations between Osterhoudt and his mother,

Sharon Williams. (2011 Trial Tr., pp. 1503-08.)

6

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Osterhoudt guilty on Counts II and
VII - for incest and rape, and also specific Counts I and V - for the incidents
after Thanksgiving 2006, and in the lambing shed. (R., pp. 22-25, 843-45.) The
jury found Osterhoudt not guilty on specific Counts Ill, IV, and VI - the incidents
at Balanced Rock, after the Fourth of July, and in the junkyard trailer. (R., pp.
22-25.) The district court sentenced Osterhoudt to unified terms of life in prison,
with 25 years fixed for rape and each of the lewd conduct convictions, and 25
years fixed for incest, each sentence to run concurrently.
Osterhoudt timely appealed. (R., pp. 956-58.)
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(R., pp. 932-37.)

ISSUES
Osterhoudt states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to present
evidence, pursuant to IRE 404(b) that Mr. Osterhoudt
provided methamphetamine to H.O., as such evidence was
not relevant to any charged count?

2.

Did the district court err in allowing the State to present
evidence, in rebuttal and pursuant to IRE 404(b) that Mr.
Osterhoudt molested H.O. when she was five years old, as
such evidence did not rebut any arguments or claims made
by the defense?

3.

Did the district court err in allowing recordings of phone
conversations between Mr. Osterhoudt and his niece, and
Mr. Osterhoudt and his mother, as substantive evidence for
the truth of the matter asserted?

4.

Even if individually harmless, did the accumulation of
preserved errors in this case deprive Mr. Osterhoudt of a fair
trial, requiring this Court to vacate his convictions?

(Appellant's brief, p. 18.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Osterhoudt failed to show that his giving and offering to give H.O.
methamphetamine in exchange for sex was not relevant as grooming
conduct, and thus failed to show the court erred in allowing the evidence?

2.

Has Osterhoudt failed to show that the district court erred by admitting
evidence that H.O. disclosed abuse when she was five to rebut
Osterhoudt's theory that H.O.'s disclosures at age 14 were retaliatory lies?

3.

Do Osterhoudt's challenges to the lack of limiting instructions for audio
recordings fail because they are unpreserved, do not rise to the level of
fundamental error, or are otherwise unsupported by Idaho law?

4.

Even if Osterhoudt could establish that the court erred, has he failed to
show that the accumulation of these errors deprived him of a fair trial?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
Osterhoudt Has Failed To Show That His Giving And Offering To Give H.O.
Methamphetamine In Exchange For Sex Was Not Relevant As Grooming
Conduct, And Thus Fails To Show The Court Erred In Allowing The Evidence

A.

Introduction
Before the second and third trials, the state filed Notices of Intent to

introduce Rule 404(b) evidence that Osterhoudt had groomed H.O. by providing
her methamphetamine. 3

For the third trial, Judge Brody ruled that 404(b)

evidence was admissible in the state's case in chief "to the extent that Judge
Wood allowed it" in the second trial.

(1/31/11 Tr., p. 68, Ls. 9-12.)

In

proceedings before the second trial, Judge Wood heard testimony from state
witnesses, and issued a thorough written ruling allowing the 404(b) evidence to
be admitted at trial. (R., pp. 289-301.) Given the date ranges for the charges
against Osterhoudt, the evidence was relevant only as to Count I, alleging rape
that occurred in November 2006, and was thus limited as such. (R., p. 298.)
Osterhoudt now challenges the district court's ruling allowing the
evidence.

3

Before the second trial, the district court conducted a hearing June 8 and 11,
2010 on the 404(b) evidence. (6/8/10 Tr., p. 13-48; 6/11/10 Tr., p. 905-999.)
Page numbers for these transcripts follow the pagination provided by the court
reporter. Transcription of the 6/8/10 hearing is in Volume I, and is followed by
transcripts of June 29 - July 9, 2010 from the second jury trial. The 6/11/10
hearing transcript is in the Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, and follows the
transcripts of October 26-30, 2009 from the first jury trial.
9

B.

Standard Of Review
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove criminal

propensity.

State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 189-90, 254 P.3d 77, 90-91 (Ct.

App. 2011) (citing I.RE. 404(b)).
another purpose.

But such evidence may be admissible for

Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91. Admissibility of

prior-bad-act evidence is evaluated under a two-tiered analysis.

~

The first tier

asks two questions:
(1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior
bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185,
1188 (2009)).

As to the first question, regarding sufficiency of evidence, the

appellate courts defer to a trial court's factual findings "if supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record." Norton, 151 Idaho at 190,
254 P.3d at 91 (citation omitted). The second question, regarding relevancy, is
an issue of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Norton, 151
Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91 (citation omitted).
The second-tier analysis for admissibility of prior-bad-act evidence
considers "whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice." Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at 91 (citing
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188). The appellate court reviews this tier
applying an abuse of discretion standard.

~

As with other discretionary

decisions by the trial court, the appellate courts consider (1) whether the trial
court understood that the issue was discretionary; (2) whether the trial court
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acted within its discretionary scope and under applicable legal standards; and (3)
whether the trial court exercised reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264
P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (citation omitted).
C.

The Record And Idaho Case Law Support Judge Wood's Ruling That
Evidence Osterhoudt Groomed H.O. By Offering Meth For Sex Was
Admissible
As to the sufficiency of evidence, Judge Wood found that there was

"sufficient foundational evidence that a reasonable jury could believe ... that
[Osterhoudt] offered [H.O.] methamphetamine for sex." (R., p. 297.) The district
court's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record, namely H.0.'s testimony that Osterhoudt offered her methamphetamine
for sex around April - July 2005. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 673, Ls. 11-14; p. 676, L. 21
- p 677, L. 1; p. 677, L. 15 - p. 678, L. 2.) Osterhoudt has failed to show why
the district court's finding should be disturbed on appeal.
Judge Wood addressed the evidence's relevance, citing the Idaho Court
of Appeals' discussion of grooming, in State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 878
P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994). In that case, the court found that a jury could perceive
evidence of drug use as part of the defendant's "method of accomplishing the
charged crime" by enticing his victim or "lower[ing] her resistance to his sexual
advances." Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 18, 878 P.2d at 192. Applying Blackstead,
Judge Wood concluded that the evidence here is "probative of a continuing
criminal design . . . to cultivate a relationship with [H.O.] to induce her
submission to his sexual demands, i.e., grooming." (R., p. 298.)
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Thus, contrary to Osterhoudt's argument (Appellant's brief, p. 23), the
evidence was not admitted simply to demonstrate Osterhoudt's bad character.
Rather, the district court admitted the evidence as grooming for the crime
charged in Count I - Osterhoudt's rape of H.O. sometime in November 2006.
Accordingly, Osterhoudt fails to demonstrate error in the district court's
application of Blackstead.
Finally, regarding the balance between the evidence's probative value and
prejudicial effect, Osterhoudt has failed to show an abuse of discretion. Judge
Wood noted, "[t]his is a question of discretion for this trial judge." (R., p. 299.) In
exercising his discretion to allow the evidence, Judge Wood reasoned that H.O. 's
testimony showed more than a mere effort to generally "curry favor" with H.O.,
but demonstrated Osterhoudt's intent to give H.O. meth in exchange for sex.
(R., p. 299.) As already discussed, the evidence is relevant under Blackstead.
The record shows that all elements under Miller are satisfied; there is no basis to
disturb this discretionary ruling by the district court on appeal.

II.
Osterhoudt Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting
Evidence That H.O. Disclosed Abuse When She Was Five To Rebut
Osterhoudt's Theory That H.O.'s Disclosures At Age 14 Were Retaliatory Lies

A.

Introduction And Standard Of Review
At trial, the district court allowed H.0.'s testimony that Osterhoudt

molested her when she was five, reasoning that there was "a highly relevant
purpose aside from mere propensity" for its admission. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1423,
Ls. 8-9.) Osterhoudt challenges this ruling, again under Rule 404(b), for error
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and abuse of discretion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-32.)

The same standard of

review, as discussed in the previous section, applies.
B.

The Evidence Of H.O.'s Disclosure At Age Five Directly Rebuts
Osterhoudt's Theory That H.O. Falsely Reported The Abuse At Issue
Here In Order To Continue Dating Her Then-Boyfriend
The challenged district court ruling allowed evidence that H.O. disclosed

abuse - specifically "touching" - by her father when she was five years old in
rebuttal. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1421, Ls. 3-4; p. 1423, L. 23 - p. 1424, L. 3.) The
narrow ruling did not allow details of the alleged abuse. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1423,
L. 23 - p. 1424, L. 3.) There was sufficient evidence, through testimony by H.O.

and investigator Gerlyn Walker, to establish the fact of H.O.'s disclosure. (2011
Trial Tr., p. 1440, L. 21 - p. 1441, L. 8.; p. 1473, L. 16 - p. 1474, L. 22.)
Accordingly, the sufficiency question is satisfied. Norton, 151 Idaho at 190, 254
P.3d at 91.
As to relevancy, the district court specified that the evidence was highly
relevant for addressing H.0.'s motive to disclose, not Osterhoudt's propensity to
abuse. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1423, Ls. 8-18.) Indeed, Osterhoudt cannot deny that
his theory at trial, presented through numerous witnesses, was that H.O. falsely
claimed Osterhoudt abused her in order to continue seeing her boyfriend at the
time, Travis Pedersen. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1421, L. 11-21; p. 1425, Ls. 3-6; 2011
PSI, p. 4.)

The evidence that H.O. disclosed abuse at age five, absent an

improper motive, directly rebuts Osterhoudt's theory that H.O. fabricated abuse
allegations to be with her boyfriend.

Osterhoudt offers no plausible argument

that the evidence was not relevant.
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Finally, as to the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect,
Osterhoudt's arguments again fail. There is no dispute that a ruling allowing the
evidence was within the district court's discretionary scope. In challenging the
ruling as an abuse of discretion, Osterhoudt implies that the district court's
comment about the door being opened by other witnesses shows that it "failed to
adequately

consider the

prejudicial

impact of the

proffered

evidence."

opened"

references

(Appellant's brief, p. 30-31.)
The court's

comment that "the door's

been

Osterhoudt's attack on H.O.'s motive for disclosure. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1421, Ls.
22-25.) The court expounded on this, stating "the topic of [H.O.'s] motivation and
disclosure was the entirety of the defense. So in that light it is a proper purpose,
there's not an undue risk of unfair prejudice." (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1423, Ls. 1619.) The court further said, "[t]here is a risk of confusion of the issues if it's not
admitted." (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1423, Ls. 19-20.) Along this vein, the court was
mindful of "misleading" the jury by "try[ing] the case in a vacuum." (2011 Trial
Tr., p. 1422, Ls. 21-22.)
Osterhoudt asserts the evidence was "pure propensity evidence"
(Appellant's brief, p. 32), essentially arguing it had no probative value. The fact
remains that the evidence tends to disprove Osterhoudt's claim of fabrication.
A ruling that ignored this probative value, as proposed by Osterhoudt, would
certainly have lacked reason. The record shows that the district court exercised
reason, and balancing the competing considerations, made a limited ruling within
its discretion.
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111.
Osterhoudt's Challenges To The Lack Of Limiting Instructions For Audio
Recordings Fail Because They Are Unpreserved And Do Not Rise To The Level
Of Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
At trial, the state moved to admit recordings of telephone conversations

Osterhoudt had with Shaylene Massie (his niece) and Sharon Williams (his
mother) while he was in jail. (2011 Trial Tr., p. 1487, Ls. 18-25; State's Exs. 6674.)

Because the recordings were disclosed late, the district court prohibited

their introduction in the state's case in chief.

4

(1/31/11 Tr., p. 49, Ls. 1-3.)

Following presentation of Osterhoudt's case, the state offered the recordings as
rebuttal.

(2011 Trial Tr., p. 1487, Ls. 18-25.) The district court admitted and

published the recordings to the jury over Osterhoudt's objections.

(2011 Trial

Tr., p. 1493, L. 4 - p. 1495, L. 17; p. 1501, L. 4 - p. 1508, L. 6.) Osterhoudt now
challenges the district court's admission of the recordings without limiting
instructions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 33-37.)
B.

Osterhoudt Failed To Preserve A Challenge To The Lack Of Limiting
Instructions
Noticeably absent from Osterhoudt's challenge about the recordings is an

assertion that he requested a limiting instruction. Indeed, the transcript does not
show that such request was made. (See 2011 Trial Tr., p. 1488, L. 15 - p. 1493,

L. 3; p. 1498, Ls. 12-13; p. 1500, L. 23 - p. 1501, L. 5; p. 1503, Ls. 7-1 O; p.
1504, Ls. 9-12.) The Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the district court

4

In a pre-trial hearing, the court suggested a continuance, but defense counsel
declined. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 46, Ls. 15-25.)
15

must give a limiting instruction sua sponte, in State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,
823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). There, as here, a limiting instruction was neither
requested nor given. J.Q.,_ The court in Moore cited Idaho Rule of Evidence 105,
which "only requires that a limiting instruction be given 'upon request."' J.Q.,_, citing
I.RE. 105. Reasoning that nothing in the rule requires an instruction without a
request, the Moore court concluded that the district court did not err in failing to
give an instruction sua sponte. J.Q.,_
Under Moore, any challenge to a district court's failure to give a limiting
instruction must be preserved by requesting such instruction.

Because

Osterhoudt failed to request a limiting instruction, he is precluded from arguing
that the district court erred in not giving one.
C.

Osterhoudt Cannot Show Fundamental Error
Where a defendant raises error for the first time on appeal, he must

establish it is reviewable as "fundamental error." State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho
376, 378, 256 P.3d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

For this, the defendant must

persuade the court that the alleged error (1) violates at least one unwaived
constitutional right, (2) plainly exists, and (3) was not harmless. State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

To meet the second prong,

defendant must show the error is apparent, without need for additional
information outside the appellate record, "including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision." J.Q.,_
Here, Osterhoudt asserts that limiting instructions were warranted but not
given. (Appellant's brief, pp. 36-37.) However, Osterhoudt has not and cannot

16

show fundamental error because there is no constitutional violation arising from
the alleged error. Where an asserted error relates to violation of a rule or statute
rather than infringement on a constitutional right, fundamental error is not
invoked. Perrv, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Osterhoudt cites only the
rules of evidence and associated case law in arguing error. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 33-37.)

He thus fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Because the

required elements for fundamental error are stated conjunctively, dissatisfaction
of one obviates further inquiry.
IV.
Even If Osterhoudt Could Establish That The Court Erred, He Has Failed To
Show That The Accumulation Of These Errors Deprived Him Of A Fair Trial

Under the cumulative error doctrine, a combination of errors, though
harmless on their own, may together show the absence of a fair trial. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010). Because the record and
law fail to support any error by the district court below, Osterhoudt's cumulative
error argument also fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that the Court
affirm Osterhoudt's judgment of conviction.
DATED this 25th day of February 2013.

orney General
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